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SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE 
DESIGN AND OPERATION OF 
LARGE WIND TURBINES 
by Dwight H. Reilly 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the Federal Wind Energy Program is to accelerate 
the development of economical wind energy systems so that wind energy 
will become a viable technological alternative to other forms of energy. 
To achieve this objective requires advancing the technology as well as 
addressing the non-technological issues which, if not understood and 
planned for, could deter the use of wind energy. The primary challenge 
for the designer of wind turbines is production of a low cost wind 
energy system that operates unattended, is reliable, is relatively 
maintenance free, and is environmentally acceptable. In meeting this 
challenge, the designer is faced with multiple design requirements which 
must be satisfied during the design process. Among the most important 
of these requirements is system safety. From the outset of the program 
the designer must address, in a formal and disciplined way, the issues 
associated with safety of hardware, safety of the environment and above 
all safety of the public and the construction and maintenance personnel. 
The Department of Energy and NASA are currently engaged in the 
development of several large wind turbines ranging in rated power from 
100 kilowatts to multi-megawatt output. Safety has been a primary con-
sideration in all of these wind turbine developments. 
The safety methodology and disciplined approach to design is 
best exemplified in complex aircraft and space programs which have 
safely transported man to the moon. This approach embodies a program 
where all functions, design, fabrication, assembly, checkout, and 
operation, are controlled by formal procedures, rigorous design reviews, 
and the close scrutiny of independent safety, reliability, and quality 
organizations. 
Modern wind turbines are a combination of centuries old windmill 
technology, standard commercial practices of the electric power and 
steel construction industry, and advanced aerospace technologies 
related to helicopter rotors, computer analyses, materials, etc. As 
such wind turbine generators should be relatively hazard free and cost 
effective if the safety techniques developed in the aerospace industry 
are applied in a judicious and systematic manner while recognizing both 
the unique and standard commercial characteristias of these devices. 
2 
The process used to assure safety in the design and operation of large 
wind turbines utilizing the Mod-2 wind turbine as an illustrative example 
is described herein. 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Program Objectives. - The Department of Energy, the NASA Lewis Re-
search Center and the Boeing Engineering and Construction Company are 
engaged jointly in the development of a 2500 kW wind turbine system 
(WTS) designated as the MOD-2 WTS. The goal of the MOD-2 project is to 
produce a wind powered electrical generating system for utility applica-
tions which will be economically competitive with conventional power 
generating equipment. The program started in August of 1977 and the 
first unit will be installed and operating by mid-1980. The MOD-2 is 
representative of large wind turbines and as such will be used herein 
to describe "typical" configurations. 
System Configuration and Operation. - Figures 1 and 2 illustrate 
the MOD-2 overall dimensions and layout. It has a rotor diameter of 
300 feet with the center of rotation 200 feet above the ground. The 
configuration embodies several advanced concepts such as a teetering up-
wind rotor, partial span pitch control, light-weight gearbox and low 
natural frequency tower; all specifically selected to minimize the cost 
of electricity. 
The WTS begins to generate power at wind speeds above 14 mph (as 
measured at th~ hub), and rated power of 2500 kW is generated at wind 
speeds between 27.5 and 45 mph. It is structurally designed to with-
stand wind speeds up to 120 mph measured at 30 feet above ground level. 
The tower is approvximately 193 feet tall and is composed of a 
150 foot long, 10 foot diameter cylindrical tube, and a flared tower 
section which has a diameter of 21 feet at its base. The tower is at-
tached to the foundation with anchor bolts. The type of foundation used 
will depend on soil conditions (in typical soil conditions a buried 
octagonal stepped foundation of reinforced concrete will be used). 
A transformer and the bus tie contactor unit are located outside 
of the tower base. All other control equipment is located within the 
tower base. The utility's electrical interface is at a fused manual 
disconnect switch located on the tower. 
The equipment layout within the nacelle is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Personnel access is via a lift within the tower. Exceptionally heavy 
equipment may be transferred to and from the nacelle through top hatches. 
Smaller loads can be hoisted from the ground by a monorail that extends 
beyond the aft end of the nacelle or by the man-lift. The lift stops at 
a deck inside the tower below the nacelle floor. Final access is by means 
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of a ladder from the deck up into the nacelle. A fire detection and 
extinguishing system, emergency exits and non-powered emergency man-
lowering devices are provided at each end of the nacelle. 
The electrical power system consists of the electrical equipment 
required for generation, conditioning, and distribution of electrical 
power within the WTS. Electrical power at appropriate voltage is 
delivered at a utility interface point which is the output side of a 
fused manual disconnect switch located at the foot of the tower. Once 
the WTS and the utility are electrically connected, the existence of 
the tie automatically results in generator voltage and frequency control, 
and thus maintains constant generator and rotor rpm. 
Normal operations are as follows: When the WTS is shut down but 
in a ready-for-operation condition, i.e., in the standby mode, the rotor 
and yaw brakes are on. The control system initiates start-up whenever 
the hub height average wind speeds are between 14 and 42 mph at the hub. 
For start-up, the yaw brake is released, the nacelle is yawed so as to 
align the rotor with the wind, blade pitch is moved from the feathered 
to the breakaway position, the rotor brake is released, and the rotor 
starts rotation. 
In the normal operating mode and with the wind speed below rated 
wind, the pitch angle is scheduled to deliver maximum power. Above 
rated wind speed the pitch angle is controlled to maintain constant rated 
power. 
The WTS is shutdown when wind speeds become too low. 
For normal shutdown, the control system causes the blades to be 
feathered, and disconnects the generator from the utility when power 
drops below 125 kW. The rotor teeter brake is applied and when the 
rotor stops rotation, the rotor brake is applied to prevent inadvertent 
rotation, all pumps are turned off, and the WTS automatically enters the 
standby mode. 
Deployment. - The MOD-2 WTS is designed to be used by electrical 
utilities either singly or in multi-unit farms, with the output tied 
into the utility grid. Operation is unattended although status infor-
mation is supplied to the utility substation via a CRT. A keyboard at 
the utility substation enables the utility operator to interrogate the 
micro-processor located in the WTS nacelle. This capability allows 
the utility operator to determine the WTS operating condition, current 
output and limited diagnostic information. 
SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
The DOE/NASA wind energy office has required that contractors make 
safety considerations an integral part of all phases of the wind turbine 
programs. The following are excerpts from the MOD-2 contract. 
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System Safety 
1. The Contractor shall provide a System Safety Plan (as a part 
of the product assurance program plan) for the development, 
fabrication, transportation, erection and operational phases 
of the program. WT safety program reviews shall be conducted 
as part of the scheduled overall design and/or program review 
to assess the status of compliance with the overall safety 
program objectives. 
2. Safety analyses shall be performed and shall specifically en-
compass the following areas of safety: 
a. Operational Safety 
The WT design shall be such that one failure or any mal-
function causing performance degradation shall not create 
a hazardous or catastrophic condition by reason of its 
mode of failure, or by the direct effect of such failure 
on the WT equipment, or personnel. 
b. Other Safe~ 
Installation, transportation, and maintenance procedures 
shall minimize human error or failure of equipment, injury 
to personnel, and damage to the WT. Mechanisms involved 
shall be designed to eliminate or minimize hazards to 
personnel in areas where maintenance will be performed. 
Responding to these requirements, the MOD-2 Product Assurance Plan 
describes how safety disciplines are integrated into the program and 
describes the specific safety analyses and reviews that are to be accom-
plished. The introduction to the safety section states: 
The wind turbine safety program will identify, evaluate and either 
eliminate or control all undesired system events (hazards) with the 
potential to: 
a. cause loss of program objectives 
b. injure personnel 
c. damage system or support equipment and facilities 
These objectives will be accomplished by identifying the equipment, 
functions and operations that may result in hazards, assessing those 
hazards for impact and probability, by instituting methods to eliminate 
hazards or reduce hazards to an acceptable risk, and to verify implemen-
tation of control measures in design, operating controls and procedures 
for installation, test and maintenance. 
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Hazard Analysis. - Hazard analysis identifies hazards inherent in 
designs and subsystem operations, assesses hazard impact and probability, 
and identifies safety requirements to eliminate hazards or reduce hazards 
to an acceptable risk. Safety requirements include: 
a. Design and procedural constraints. 
b. Requirements for safety devices and warning methods. 
c. Special procedures, protective equipment and personnel training. 
The plan goes on to further define these elements and to explain how 
the hazard analyses and design reviews will be conducted and corrective 
actions taken where needed. Figure 4, taken from the MOD-2 Safety Plan, 
illustrates this process. 
Initial construction, testing and on-going maintenance activities 
can pose problems commonly associated with industrial safety. The MOD-2 
program ensures compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 
State, NASA and Boeing requirements, and has charged line management with 
the prime responsibility for enforcing daily compliance with established 
safety standards. Audits are performed to ensure that the safety plan is 
adequately implemented in all operational areas and any deficiencies, cor-
rective action and/or follow-up actions taken are recorded and maintained 
on fil e. 
Specific safety plans are developed to address the safety considera-
tions associated with the site activation, erection and test phases of 
the program. 
As the development of the WTS progresses from the conceptual and 
preliminary design phases, the overall design approach to safety and the 
solutions to specific potential safety problems are established. These 
are incorporated into the program specifications. Figure 5 depicts the 
development process and how safety considerations are factored into the 
program. The following section describes how each of the elements shown 
in Figure 5 are implemented. 
SAFETY APPROACH, ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION 
Figure 6 illustrates the disciplines used to assure the safety of 
the MOD-2 WTS. The approach used is to produce a safe-line design (i.e., 
that the structure sustain no failure during its service life) and then 
to provide a means of safely stopping the WTS should a failure occur. 
This "fail safe" philosophy provides a back-up safety system both for 
maintenance personnel and to prevent major damage to the WTS. Following 
is a discussion of each major element shown in Figure 6. 
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Environment. - Large wind turbines could be deployed in a wide 
variety of locations and physical environments. In order to assure 
that the MOD-2 will be capable of safely operating in these environ-
ments, all elements of the system are designed to meet the environmental 
criteria specified in Figure 7. The values specified in this figure are 
based on research by both NASA/DOE and The Boelng Company and represent 
conditions that are applicable to potential WTS sites. 
Operating Profile. - In order to compute the structural loads 
that the WTS must safely carry, it is necessary to calculate the load 
spectra that the WTS components will be subjected to over the 30 year 
life. For each revolution of the rotor, the blade structure experiences 
a cyclic reversal of chordwise bending loads due to gravity (1 per rev 
loads) and cyclic air loads due to the variation of wind speed with 
height above the ground at a rate of two per rev loads. These load 
variations also experience the effects of wind gusts. In addition, 
the components experience the loading variations of each startup and 
shutdown cycle. The one and two per rev loads over the 30 year WTS 
life represent 200 and 400 million cycles respectively. The number of 
cycles and the corresponding causes of startup/shutdown are as follows: 
21,900 
1,500 
180 
725 
24,355 
low wind speed shutdowns 
high wind speed shutdowns 
planned shutdowns for maintenance 
unplanned shutdowns for maintenance/spurious faults 
These cycle frequencies are based on analysis of the wind spectra 
and a detailed reliability/maintainability analysis of all of the system 
components. As added conservatism to assure safe-life design, the above 
cycles are increased by a factor of three to 73,000 cycles. It is also 
expected that the WTS will experience some partial but incomplete startups 
at marginally low wind speeds. The structural fatigue life therefore 
conservatively assumes an additional 73,000 cycles up to one-half of the 
operating cyclic stress levels. All cyclic loading contributes to 
structural fatigue stresses in the WTS. Although the startup/shutdown 
cycles are relatively few, their stress magnitudes are high and contribute 
most significantly to fatigue life. 
Load Calculations. - Loads are calculated based upon the natural 
and induced environments defined in the previous subsection. A brief 
description of the major considerations associated with the loading 
condition calculations follow: 
o Limit Operating Loads - Maximum operating loads result from 
extreme gustiness during normal operation in which the nacelle 
is at a yaw angle within ± 20 degrees of the mean wind direction. 
The limit operating load is the maximum 99.99 percentile 
calculated load. 
o Operating Fault Loads 
o Overs peed - 115 percent of normal 
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o Inadvertent blade feathering - caused by loss of hydraulic 
pressure, faulty actuator or servo control. 
o Inadvertent rotor, yaw and teeter braking - caused by 
inadvertent loss of hydraulic pressure, faulty actuators or 
control system. 
o Hazard Load Conditions - During operation, the WTS must withstand 
structural loads due to seismic disturbances, projectile impact, 
transportation and handling, lightning, hail, and temperature 
extremes. 
o Seismic - The WTS, excluding the foundation, will withstand 
seismic disturbances characteristic of Zone 3. The foun-
dation shall be designed to seismic disturbances and soil 
conditions appropriate to the site. 
o Projectile Impact - The blades, nacelle and tower are 
designed to withstand impact of 4 lb. projectile at 35 mph 
(or equivalent momentum) without structural failure. This 
loading condition could come from bird impact, objects pro-
pelled by the wind, etc. 
o Transportation and Handling - The WTS components and shipping 
containers are designed to sustain the transportation 
environment in Figure 7. These conditions conservatively 
cover all of the environments anticipated during transpor-
tation throughout most of the U.S. 
o Lightning - The WTS must withstand lightning strikes without 
structural damage. (The characteristics of lightning strikes 
are defined in the MOD-2 System Specification.) 
o Hail - During operation, the WTS must withstand structural 
damage the impact of 1.0 inch diameter hail stones (50 pcf 
density) with 66.6 ft. per second terminal velocity. 
o Temperature Extremes - The WTS is designed to operate in the 
temperature range of -400 F to +1200 F. 
o Non-operating Load Conditions - The extreme environmental loading 
conditions which are considered for the WTS in the parked con-
figuration are extreme wind, snow and ice. 
o Extreme Winds - The MOD-2 WTS is designed to withstand 
loads associated with a maximum steady wind of 120 MPH at 
the 30 ft. reference elevation. The WTS shall withstand 
the design maximum wind with the rotor parked and braked 
in any position. 
o Snow - WTS structural components are designed to withstand 
21 lb/sq ft. of snow on the rotor blade when parked hori-
zontally and 41 lb/sq ft. of snow on the nacelle roof. 
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o Ice - WTS structural components are designed to withstand 
2.0 in. of glaze ice (with density of 60 lb/ft3) on all 
exposed surfaces. 
Although the loads are analytically calculated, the analytical 
models were verified by wind tunnel tests using 1/20th scale models, 
and full scale static buckling tests. 
Allowables and Safety Margins. - With all the loading conditions 
established, the capability of the selected structural materials to 
withstand all loading conditions is then determined. Extensive struc-
tural testing is performed on typical structural sections to verify 
the allowable stresses. Buckling tests are performed to confirm the 
allowable buckling stresses at the maximum loads and cyclic fatigue 
tests are performed to establish the allowable stresses which preclude 
failure over the 30 year life. Further assurance is provided by 
safety factors applied to the design limit loads. These factors of 
safety are defined as follows: 
(a) Factors of Safety 
Factors of safety shall be applied only to loads and 
pressures. They shall not be applied to heating rates, temperatures, 
thermal stresses and deformations, or any other environmental phenomenon 
unless otherwise specified. 
(b) Limit Load Factor 
There shall be no buckling, yielding or permanent de-
formation of structure under design limit loads obtained when the 
following safety factors are applied to the limit load described in 
Section 4.0. 
Hoisting and handling 3.0 
All other conditions 1.0 
Pressure vessels, lines and fittings shall withstand maximum operating 
pressure or relief valve pressure setting, whichever is greater, 
multiplied by the following safety factors to preclude yielding: 
Hydraulic Systems 
Pneumatic Systems 
(c) Ultimate Load Factor 
2.0 
2.5 
There shall be no ultimate failures under the design 
ultimate loads obtained when the following safety factors are applied 
to the limit loads described in Section 4.0. 
Hoisting and Handl ing Loads 5.0 
Rotor Blade Buckling 1.35 
All other conditions 1.25 
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Pressure vessels, lines and fittings shall withstand maximum operating 
pressure or relief valve pressure setting, whichever is greater, multiplied 
by the following safety factors to preclude bursting: 
Hydraulic Systems 
Pneumatic Systems 
(d) Casting Factors 
4.0 
5.0 
A minimum casting factor of 2.0 shall be applied to the 
design load factors for all castings. 
(e) Fitting and Lug Factors 
In addition to the foregoing factors, a fitting factor of 
1.15 shall be applied to design loads for all fittings. This factor 
shall apply to all portions of the fitting, the means of attachment of 
the fitting and the bearing stresses of the members joined. In the case 
of integral fittings the part shall be treated as a fitting up to the 
point where the section properties become typical of the member. This 
factor does not apply to standard structural steel connections designed 
in accordance with AISC specifications. 
(f) Tower Overturning 
The foundation shall be designed so that no uplift occurs 
at any point on the base for any design load condition, when the structure 
is founded on a yielding base. All base materials except solid rock 
and hard shale shall be considered as yielding. A safety factor against 
overturning of not less than 1.5 shall be used when comparing dead load 
resisting moment with live load overturning moment taken about the toe 
of the foundation. Where the structure is founded on solid rock or hard 
shale the above requirement against uplift need not be met; however, a 
minimum safety factor against overturning of 2.5 shall be used. 
Structural Member Sizing. - Structural member sizing is accomplished 
by a disciplined mUlti-point analysis of all the loading conditions and 
corresponding allowables. The analysis recognizes all the potential 
combinations of loading conditions and the number of occurrences during 
the system life of 30 years. Although structural sizing with its applied 
factors of safety is a well understood technology, the calculations and 
the design details are verified for critical components by structural 
test of full scale hardware as indicated in figure 6. 
Fail-Safe, Safe Life and Product Assurance. - Fail-safe is a design 
concept that requires the component or structure to fail in such a way 
that either adequate warning is given the operator ~hat a failure is 
pending so corrective action can be initiated, or the design automatically 
places the machine in a safe operating mode or is shutdown. 
Mechanical and electrical components are designed such that failure 
of these parts result in safe shutdown. Where this is not possible, 
redundant components are considered to keep the machine in an operating 
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mode while the operator is warned through automatic devices. The main-
tenance program provides assurance that the redundancy has not been lost. 
Use of redundant circuit paths, relays, etc. on critical systems where 
failure could result in rotor overs peed is particularly important. 
For structural components fail-safe requires that the structure be 
capable of sustaining detectable damage (fatigue or other) for a reasonable 
time between inspections without catastrophic failure. To achieve this con-
cept, multiple load paths are provided in the structure, or a failure 
detecting system is required. 
For the MOD-2 program, all parts of the structure not designed to fall-
safe strength criteria meet a safe-life strength criteria. Safe-life is a 
structural concept which require that the structure sustain no failure durlng 
its service life. To achieve this concept, use is made of load factors and/or 
factors of safety during design. These additional factors of safety may be 
achieved by reducing the allowable working stress to a level that is low 
enough to preclude crack propagations to failure. MOD-2 hardware is designed 
to the safe-life concept when high cost or weight penalties prevent use of 
the fail-safe concept. To obtain safe-life design, hardware elements or 
components have load-time histories established for their expected service 
life and have service life analysis including fatigue analysis and tests 
conducted to verify adequate life. 
Product assurance plans and procedures are an integral part of tho~e 
activities assuring the safety of the WTS. The Statement of Work and Con-
tractor Product Assurance Plan for the MOD-2 program recognize both the 
unique and standard commercial characteristics of the machine. Where unique 
or critical components, procedures or practices are involved, more stringent 
controls are invoked. Critical forgings or blade material, as an example, 
may be traced from the original melt or rolling process. Requirements are 
relaxed, however, to allow cost effective use of standard "off the shelf 
hardware" poss i b 1 e. 
Whether unique or standard, the test, inspection, and acceptance pro-
cedures and criteria for each component and each process in the fabrication 
and assembly of the WTS are defined. The reject or repair of components or 
processes such as a weld which fails to pass the quality acceptance criterla 
is controlled by disciplined record procedures. These data are documented 
and reviewed for proof of completion at the "readiness" reVlews which 
precede each of the major program milestones such as site installation, 
first rotation, and turnover to the operating utility. Details of the 
product assurance/inspection function are discussed in the section related to 
hardware fabrication, installation, and acceptance testing. 
Preliminary Design. - With the foregoing data, structural members are 
sized and the preliminary design is established. This preliminary design is 
then subjected to critical review by all the staff technical disciplines. 
An integral part of the preliminary design process is the conduct of 
a failure mode and effect analyses (FMEA), wherein all possible failure 
modes are identified, their effects analyzed and corrective actions taken 
as appropriate to preclude undesirable consequences. The FMEA's are com-
pleted by the cognizant designers and reviewed by system engineers and a 
reliability specialist. The failure severity code used in the analysis is 
described in Table 1 and an example of a completed FMEA is shown in Figure 8. 
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Completion of the FMEA's by the designers as an in-line part of the 
design process resulted in numerous design changes to either prevent 
serious failure modes or reduce their impact. Whenever applicable, failure 
frequency data was included in the analyses to quantify the probability 
of occurrences. 
The failure frequency data used to quantify the failure mode fre-
quencies was developed as part of a comprehensive reliability/maintaina-
bility analyses conducted during conceptual and preliminary design. 
Extensive research was conducted to accurately estimate the expected 
Mod-2 component failure rates. This analysis was conducted on all of 
the WTS elements, including major items such as the generator and gear-
box, and smaller component parts (e.g., switches, connectors, sensors 
etc.). The failure rate data was taken directly from utility field 
experience whenever such data was available. For components not nor-
mally used in the utility industry (e.g., hydraulic actuators) appli-
cable commercial experience was used. In developing the failure rates, 
actual hands-on experience was used in lieu of theoretical predictive 
data thus providing a more realistic appraisal of the expected field 
experience. 
Over 750 failure modes were analyzed and numerous corrective 
actions were implemented to preclude costly failures. Special atten-
tion was directed at all potentially catastrophic failure modes. The 
results of this effort are summarized in Table 2. Two examples from 
the failure mode analyses which affected design are discussed below: 
(1) Potential failure modes such as control linkage binding, 
bearing failures, or hydraulic control failures are not 
catastrophia because redundance is now built into these 
systems. As shown in Figure 9, each blade tip and associated 
control linkage operates off an independent hydraulic 
actuator system. Redundancy in these systems and their 
associated control sensors assures that a failure in either 
system does not affect the other. In addition the WTS can 
be brought to a safe stop by feathering one tip even though 
the opposing tip has been driven to the worse case high 
power position. 
(2) Use of A633 low alloy steel in the WTS blades required that 
consideration be given to development of a crack detection 
system to provide warning of the presence of a potentially 
damaging fatigue crack or equivalent damage anywhere in the 
outer surface of the rotor. The system developed is shown 
in Figure 10. A continuous flow of pressurized air is pro-
vided to each blade. The flow rate to each blade is elec-
tronically compared. Any unbalance between the two flows 
causes the crack detection system to signal the WTC control 
system to feather the blade tips and shut the machine down 
before any significant rotor damage occurs. 
In addition to directly affecting the design of the WTG, the FMEA 
is a valuable tool in developing checkout, inspection and maintenance 
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requlrements and procedures. Durlng the prellminary des1gn phase, 
components cr1tical to the fail-safe ph1losophy are 1dent1f1ed. Spec1al 
attent10n is given these 1tems dur1ng assembly, checkout and ma1nten-
ence to assure redundant des1gn features are ava1lable and act1ve dur1ng 
the l1fe of the hardware and hardware w1th s1ngle p01nt fa1lure modes 
are adequately inspected and ma1nta1ned to m1n1ze the probab1l1ty of 
the single point failure. 
Prellmlnary design 1S concluded with an extensive "read1ness" 
reV1ew by NASA. ThlS review assures that all required and planned 
analyses, 1ncluding safety analyses, have been satlsfactorily completed 
and that the preliminary des1gn meets all requ1rements. The NASA then 
author1zes the program to proceed into the deta1l design phase. 
Deta1l Des1gn. - Dur1ng the detail design phase the approved pre-
l1minary des1gn 1S further developed into deta1l draw1ngs Wh1Ch can be 
released for fabr1catl0n. During this per10d all of the staff d1sci-
pl1nes aga1n review and analyze all deta1ls of the des1gn. All of the 
plans, procedures, cr1teria, and spec1f1cat1ons, 1ncludlng ma1ntenance 
plans and equipment, safety plans, product assurance plans, etc., are 
final1zed. During th1S period, the total conf1guration 1S placed under 
rig1d configuration control. Any proposed des1gn change must undergo a 
d1sciplined review by all technolog1es to assess the impace of a change 
on all elements of the program. The design change could 1mpact ma1ntenance 
procedures, safety, fabr1cat1on processes, product assurance 1nspection 
requirements, structural 1ntegrity, etc. Only after thorough evaluation 
1nd1cates the change to be favorable w1ll a change be authorized. The 
NASA reV1ews all changes and must prov1de approval to proceed on all 
s1gn1ficant changes which affect form, fit, function or contractual 
spec1f1cation requ1rements 
The detail des1 gn phase concl udes with an intensive "readiness 
rev1ew" by the NASA. Th1S review assures that the deta1l design meets 
all requirements. The DOE/NASA can then authorlze the program to pro-
ceed w1th hardware fabrication, assembly, functional test, installation 
and checkout, and acceptance testing. 
Fabrication, Installation and Acceptance. - Th1S is a critlcal 
phase of the WTS program Wh1Ch must assure that the WTS is bU1lt to the 
design conf1guration, that 1t is bU1lt with the spec1fied quality, and 
that testlng verlfies that the system meets all requlrements. The sig-
nificant responsibility during these activ1ties lies with the Product 
Assurance Organizat1on. As previously d1scussed, extens1ve plans and 
requirements for quality have been documented and discipl1ned processes 
and procedures establ ished. Inspection and test of each deta1l is mon-
itored per the planned procedures and accepted or rejected per the 
established criteria. Each process, funct1on, and component hardware 
is verified to be within speciflcatlon. For example, product assurance 
procedures and requirements for the mater1als and structures of the 
Mod-2 WTS include destructive and non-destruct1ve testing. 
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These tests verify that the materials and built up structure of 
the WTS meet the design requirements. Destructive tests on representa-
tive samples of material include: 
(1) chemical analysis, 
(2) static strength, including yield and ultimate tensile 
strengths, 
(3) charpy V-notch impact test at -400 F. 
In addition, ultrasonic (non-destructive) testing of representa-
tive material samples is planned. Specific weld inspections are speci-
fied on the design drawings. For example, the current Mod-2 plans 
require visual, penetrant, radiographic and ultrasonic inspection of 
critical blade welds. 
All testing is performed per the approved Mbd-2 test plan in a se-
quential manner that verifies product integrity and system safety prior 
to proceeding to the next step. The verification testing starts with 
functional checkout and test of the system assemblies prior to trans-
porting to the WTS site. This testing assures that no unplanned 
event could cause a safety hazard during erection, test or operation of 
the WTS. It also assures that all functions are properly interfaced and 
that all systems including the control system hardware and software 
function per all of the specification requirements. 
Sequential testing during installation and checkout assures system 
integrity and system safety prior to subsequent installation events. 
For example, following erection of the tower, and prior to installation 
of the nacelle, safety related tests such as the following are planned 
to assure product integrity and readiness for nacelle installation: 
(1) Continuity test of installed electrical circuits. 
(2) High potential tests of power transmission circuits. 
(3) Bus tie contacted function test. 
(4) Accessory power distribution and control. 
(5) Operation of nacelle access device. 
(6) Operation of tower man-lift. 
(7) Alighment and functional check of nacelle and drive train 
components. 
(8) Functional check of mechanical equipment and the elec-
trical/electronic control system components. 
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With the system completely installed and all functional testing 
including fail-safe verification completed, a "readiness review" will 
be conducted. Satisfactory completion of this review will authorize 
initial wind powered rotation. Initial rotation will be performed at 
wind velocities between 15 and 20 mph. The WTS will be initially 
operated at 8 rpm using manual controls. During this operation, all 
test data will be closely monitored to verify that the data system is 
completely operative and that structural dynamic coupling is as pre-
dicted. When it is verified that the WTS is operating as predicted at 
8 rpm, further rotational testing will be initiated at 17.5 rpm at wind 
velocities less than 20 mph. Initial rotation at 17.5 rpm will be with 
the synchronizer enable command inhibited. This will allow verifica-
tion of phase rotation and other tests such as automatic control system 
functions and the ability to perform automatic shutdown. With success-
ful completion of these planned tests, the WTS will be operated in 
synchronization with the utility network. After complete verification 
testing and demonstration in all operating modes at all wind speeds, 
and completion of user training, the system will be approved by NASA 
for turnover to the operating utility company. 
The foregoing discussion of sequential testing has illustrated the 
planned discipline which will result in an inherently safe system. To 
assure safety during fabrication, installation and testing, the manu-
facturing plan, the test plan, and the product assurance plan have 
specific sections devoted to procedures for safety of personnel. A 
safety engineer is assigned for daily monitoring of personnel safety 
systems and procedures. To assure safety of the utility maintenance 
personnel, a system maintenance manual including safety procedures is 
delivered with the WTS. The training program for construction, test 
and maintenance personnel is a contractual requirement. 
The following section describes the significant features which are 
being designed into the Mod-2 WTS to enhance personnel safety. 
MOD-2 SAFETY SYSTEMS 
The previous sections of this document have explained how safety 
issues are specified in the initial contracts, expanded in the project 
specifications and implemented in the design. This section presents the 
results of these efforts on the Mod-2 WTS. 
The Mod-2 Safety design is summarized as follows: 
o All structural elements are designed to last for the life of the 
system (Safe-Life design) 
o Loads calculated 
o Safety Factors added 
o Tests conducted to reduce uncertainty 
o Strengths of materials 
o Loads 
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o Microprocessor control system constantly monitors WTS condition 
and shuts the system down upon failure of a primary device or a 
monitoring device. 
o Orderly shutdown when failures occur 
o Open circuits cause shutdown (i.e., signals from sensors) 
normally "hot" so that microprocessor sees closed loop) 
o Independent, redundant safety sensors and shutdown system 
incorporated 
o Full protection for electrical equipment 
o Compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Act and other 
applicable construction codes. 
o Gross hazards and failure modes and effects analysis conducted 
resulting in numerous additlonal safety features. 
The approach to achieving system integrity has been previously dis-
cussed. The following is a brief discussion of the control system which 
schedules the on-going HTS operation and implements the failsafe actions 
to shutdown the WTS should faults occur. 
The control system provides the sensing, computation, and commands 
necessary for unattended operation of the IHS as shown in Figure 11. 
The controller is a microprocessor which is located in the nacelle con-
trol unit and initiates start-up of the WTS when the wind speed is 
within prescribed limits. After start-up, it computes blade pitch and 
nacelle yaw commands to maximize the power output for varying wind 
conditions. Continuous monitoring of wind conditions, rpm, power and 
equipment status is also provided by the microprocessor which will shut 
down the WTS for out-of-tolerance conditions. 
A control panel and CRT terminal are located in the tower base to 
provide operating and fault data displays and manual control during 
maintenance. A remote CRT terminal at the utility substation will pro-
vide display and limited WTS controls. 
The WTS is protected from computer system failures by an independ-
ent back-up failsafe shutdown system. The failsafe system provides 
sensor redundancy on critical components, and initiates shutdown inde-
pendent of the primary control syste~ when necessary. A failsafe 
philosophy is used for all equipment condition signal~~ wherein presence 
of a voltage is an indication of a "good ll signal. Thus, should a wire 
or connection to or from a sensor open, the WTS will detect a loss of 
voltage and shutdown the WTS. Figure 12 lists the signals monitored by 
both the normal control system and the independent back-up failsafe 
system. 
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The WTS electrical power system, Figure 13, employs a four pole 
synchronous generator containing an integral brushless exciter. 
Excitation control is provided to maintain proper voltage prior to 
synchronization with the utility and to provide a constant power fac-
tor output afterwards. Protective relays are provided to guard 
against potential electrical faults, out-of-tolerance performance, or 
equipment failures. These relays detect over-voltage, loss of exci-
tation, under-frequency, overcurrent, reverse phase sequence, reverse 
power and differential current, and will protect the system by inhibit-
ing synchronization, directing the control system to shut down, or if 
required, tripping the generator circuit breaker, resulting in a high 
speed shutdown. The generator is protected by overtemperature sensors 
on the forward and aft bearings and in the windings. 
Power is delivered to the utility transmission line through a bus 
tie contactor. Its operation is controlled by automatic synchroniza-
tion equipment which is both redundant and failsafe. Accessory power 
for operation, control and maintenance is obtained from the utility or 
from the generator output depending on the operating mode, and is 
internally conditioned to approprlate voltage levels. A battery, 
floatlng across a charger, provides an uninterruptable power supply 
for operation of protective devices and critical loads. 
The major reasons for incorporating the safety features discussed 
above are: (1) to ensure that the public will not be inJured by WTS 
failures and (2) to minimize damage to the WTS in the event of hard-
ware failures. In addition to tnese considerations, the WTS must pro-
vide a safe environment for tne conduct of scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance activities. All components must be accessible and must 
be installed such that they can be removed and replaced without 
imposing hazards to maintenance personnel. The Mbd-2 WTS complies 
with all applicable OSHA requirements and has used MIL-STD-1472, 
IIHuman Engineering Design Crlteria for Military Systems, Equipment 
and Facilities,1I as a design guide. These design criteria, as well 
as the general design goals discussed previously are summarized in 
Fi gure 14. 
In addition to the IIdesign for safetyll criteria shown in Figure 
14, it is necessary to incorporate back-up personnel safety systems 
such as emergency egress doors, and escape devices. Conduct of the 
gross hazards analysis results in the identification of such addi-
tional safety features. These features, along with several others 
discussed previously, are summarized in Figure 15. 
CONCLUSION 
The modern wind turbine is a unique marriage of the procedures, 
practices, and technology developed and used by the uti1it~ construc-
tion and aerospace industries. Development of wind energy as an 
acceptable, low cost energy source requires wind energy systems dem-
onstrate reliable, safe operation. The safety assurance program 
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evolved for these systems makes use of the lessons learned from these 
industries and the safety, reliability, and quality assurance tools 
developed by them. 
The operational safety of wind turbines is directly related to 
the prevention of rotor overs peed and structural failures of major 
components such as blades, hub, drive train and tower. These failure 
modes are agravated by the variable environment to which the machine 
is subjected, the inherent dynamic characteristics of the machine, 
and the need to operate and maintain the system with a minimum of on-
site operator monitoring and control. 
To meet these challenges, an engineering and safety program has 
been developed that involves a careful definition of the WTS natural 
and operati ng envi ronments, use of well proven structural desi gn 
criteria and analysis techniques, an awarene~s of potential hazards 
via the FMEA and gross hazards analysis, and use of a failsafe and 
redundant component engineering phhlosophy. It is expected that this 
program, when coupled to an effective quality assurance and system 
checkout program, will demonstrate that wind energy systems such as 
Mod-2 will meet the safety and reliability objectives of the DOE/NASA 
Large Wind Turbine Program. 
Impnct 
Hazard , Personnel 
category Function Repair cost Time to ropair injury 
and lind and 
Nona Q::> Under $1,000 Under 2 days None Minimal 
and and and 
None Under $1,000 Under 2 days First aid 
critical 
Marginal []:::> 
or or or 
Loss of Up to $10,000 Up to 10 Days I Hospital 
Critical function []:::> 
or or or 
Loss of Over Over Fatal or 
system [!:::>. $10,000 10 days permanent Catastrophic disable 
Q::::> Minor items that can be repaired with convenienca. 
[]:::>. No loss of generating capability, but repair must be accomplished within 2 weeks 
to avoid shutdown. 
[]:::>. Causas WTS shutdown. 
[3':::::> Destruction of major element such as rotor or gear box. 
Table 1, FMEA Safety and Failure Severity Category Guide 
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00 
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Table 2, Summary of Major Failures and Effects - MOD-2-107 
Failure Effect Corrective action 
Structural failures 
Rotor 
• Ice forms and is thrown off Could Injure public - ~emote possibility Ice detection system added 
• Blade fatigue cracks Loss of part of rotor and possible Crack detection system shuts down 
• Spar buckling secondary damage if allowed to progress WTS prior to incurring serious damage 
• Fatigue crack at control Safe hfe design 
tiP spindle end thread or at Fatigue tests 
tip-blade interface Inspection schedule 
• Inboard Joint-rotor to hub bolt Mld-blaae assembly buckling test 
or flan~ weld failure 
• Broken teeter trunnion or flange 
cracks 
• Buckling inboard seCtiOns or hub 
compression skins 
Drive 
• Broken low speed shaft Emergency shutdown effected prior 
• Broken quill shaft bulkhead Loss of load to reaching damaging overspeed 
joint Safe hfe design 
• Teeter shaft or flange cracks POSSible extensive rotor damage Stram gage correlation 
Safe hfe design 
Tower 
• Failure of structure or foundation Extensive damage Safe life design 
Control system failures 
• Signal to one tip incorrectly dnves Emergency shutdown triggered by None required, analysis verifies that 
control surface to zero pitch differential of tip position signals one tiP operative can safely stop rotor 
• Control hnkage to one tip jams 
• Control system signal to both Emergency shutdown triggered by None required - shutdown occurs prior 
pitch actuators incorrectly dnves generator output power sensor to damaging overspeed 
control surfaces to zero pitch 
• Power output sensor fails, callmg Damaging overs peed pOSSible if load System changed to command shutdown 
for power Increase when system drops off prior to initiating shutdown prior to load dropping off. Also, backup 
is already at full power output power sensor signal sent to controller 
. 
Electrical power failures 
• Synchronizer provides Signal to High current transient causing high torque Synchronizer is fully redundant and 
close bus tie contactor too soon or load on the generator that could cause fail safe 
too late (WTS not proper phase mechanical damage to generator or 
relationship or voltage to mate drive train 
with bus) 
• Loss of commercial power while Rotor speed increases None required - shutdown occurs prior 
WTS is at rated power to damaging overspeed 
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Figure 1. - Wind turbine configuration. 
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Figure 4. - Hazard corrective action loop. 
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Figure 5. - Safety disciplines integrated into WTS development. 
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Figure 6. - MOD-2 safety assurance. 
Transportation Storage Installation Operational 
Duration 3 weeks 3 months 
30 years (2104 hr/yr standby) 
, (6662 hr/yr pwr opn) 
Wmd Negligible Negligible 120 mph at 30 ft reference elevation 
Shoc~ Rail: 20G peak Truck: 3G peak Negligible See: seismic 
Vibration 3G Negligible As induced by the rotor, high speed shaft Gearbox 
Tempsrature Same as operational Same as operational ·400 F (.400 C) to 1200 F (48.90 C) ambient air 
Solar radiation Same as operational Same as operational 363 BTU/ft
2lhr, 4 hrs d8lly 
6 months annually 
Lightning Negligible Negligible Variable current profile over 360 ms, 
with 200 kA peak current 
Rain Same as operational Same as operational 4 incheslhour 
1.0 inch dis. 50 Ib/cu. ft. 1.0 Inch dl3., 50 Ib/cu. ft. 1.0 inch dla., 50 Ib/cu. ft., 66.6 ft/sec vel. 
Hail 132 ft/sec. vel. (apillicable to 66.6 ft/sec. vel. (applicable to (horiz. & vertical surfaces) 
shipping conatiners) storage containers) 
2.0 inches thickness, 2.0 inches thickness 2.0 inches thickness, 60 Ibs/cu. ft. 
Ice (glaze) 60 Ibs/cu. ft. (applicable to 
shippmg contamers) 
60 Ibs/cu. ft. (applicable to (on all external surfaces) 
storage contamers) 
Snow 41 Ibs/sq. ft. (shipping 41 Ibs/sq. ft. (storage Blade: 21 Ibs/sq. ft. 
containers) (containers) Nacelle: 41 Ibs/sq. ft. 
Humidity, sand/ Same as operational Exposure equivalent to MIL·STD·210B 
dust. salt spray, Same as operational for exposed or sheltered ground equipment, 
fungus as applicable 
Fauna Exposure to insects Same as transportation Same as transportation plus 4 lb. birds at 35 mph for stationary surfaces above150 ft. 
Noise Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Seismic Negligible Negligible Site specific 
Altitude Same as operational Same as operational Sea level to 7000 ft. 
Figure 7. - WTS design environment. 
MOD·2 Failure Mod" and Effects AnalysIs 
suBSYSTEM I COMPONENT PAGE 126 
TO\,lER - Et'S TOWEq-HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE FMEA NO 7.2.1.1 
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• 
FAILURE FRECUENCY FAILURE SEVERITY 
FAILURE I FAILURE RATE MEANTIME 
FAILURE MODE BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC 
MODE NO FREQ. '$ " 10-6 PER HOUR IYEARS) I II III IV 
1 ::10 I .8 286 ~ X 
2 '0 I .8 578 I I x I 
~ 25 I .8 578 I I v 
• , I I I I 
FAILURE DETeCTION METHODS 
, GENERATOR POWER TNDICATTnN INDICATES ZERO POWER~ BTC POSITION INDICATES "OPEN". 
2 -3 GENERATOR POWER WDICATION INDICATES ZERO POWER; GCB AND BTC. POSITION INDICATES 
BOTH ARE "OPEN" • 
• 
FAILURE ~uSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION ClF APPLICABLE) 
1 DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT PROTECTION- RELAY WILL CAUSE THE GeB TO OPEN OR AS A BACKUP. 
THE DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT PROTECTION CIRCUIT WILL CAUSE THE BTC TO OPEN. 
2 GENERATOR OR BTeU DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT PROTECTION OR GENERATOR OVER-CURRENT 
PROTECTION CIRCUITS WILt CAUSE THE GCB AND BTC TO OPEN 
3 SAME AS 2 PLUS THE GROUND CURRENT RELAY WILL CAUSE THE GCB TO OPEN. 
. 
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Figure 8. - MOD-2 failure mode and effects analysis. 
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Figure 13. - Electrical system schematic. 
• Failure modes and effects analysis will be conducted 
on all WTS clements 
• All structural members "safe life" designed, all controls 
and electrical systems designed "fail safe" 
• Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
(Public Law 91·596) and applicable State Safety 
Regulations 
• MI L·STD·1472, Human Engineering D':!sign Criteria 
for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities 
• IEEE Standard 142·1972, IEEE Recommended 
Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial 
Power Systems 
• ANSI C2 American National Standard, National 
Electrical Safety Code, 1977 Edition 
Figure 14. - MOD-2 safety design criteria. 
• Primary controls shutdown WTS upon failure; backup 
shutdown system, independent of control system logic 
and commands, protects WTS in case of control system failure 
• Through electrical system protection with redundant, fail safe 
synchronizer and uninterruptable power supply 
• Rotor crack detection system, ice detectors on blades 
• Automatic fire detection and.extinguishing system 
o Emergency exit doors and "Rescumatic" device to allow 
egress from either end of Nacelle in case of uncontrolled fire 
• Capability to remove person on stretcher from Nacelle 
• Unauthorized entry disables WTS 
• "Buddy" system used for all maintenance 
• All hazardous rotating devices guarded 
• Aircraft warning lights and markings per FAA regulations 
• Scheduled maintenance plan to ensure integrity of 
safety systems 
Figure 15. - MOD-2 safety system features. 
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